Master Analytic philosophy methods, debates, and key figures. Use for: logical analysis, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology in the analytic tradition. Triggers: 'analytic', 'Frege', 'Russell', 'Wittgenstein', 'logical positivism', 'Vienna Circle', 'possible worlds', 'modal logic', 'qualia', 'functionalism', 'physicalism', 'Kripke', 'Putnam', 'Davidson', 'Quine', 'ordinary language', 'thought experiment', 'conceptual analysis', 'naturalism', 'supervenience'.
Master the methods, debates, and key figures of the analytic tradition—the dominant approach in contemporary Anglophone philosophy characterized by argumentative rigor, logical analysis, and close attention to language.
FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD (1879-1930)
├── Frege: Logic, sense/reference
├── Russell: Logical atomism, definite descriptions
├── Early Wittgenstein: Tractatus, logical form
└── Moore: Common sense, analysis
LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1920-1950)
├── Vienna Circle: Schlick, Carnap, Neurath
├── Verification principle
├── Elimination of metaphysics
└── Unity of science
ORDINARY LANGUAGE (1940-1970)
├── Later Wittgenstein: Language games, family resemblance
├── Austin: Speech acts, How to Do Things with Words
├── Ryle: Category mistakes, The Concept of Mind
└── Strawson: Descriptive metaphysics
CONTEMPORARY PERIOD (1960-present)
├── Philosophy of Language: Kripke, Putnam, Davidson
├── Philosophy of Mind: Fodor, Dennett, Chalmers
├── Metaphysics Revival: Lewis, Armstrong, van Inwagen
├── Epistemology: Gettier, Goldman, Williamson
└── Ethics: Rawls, Parfit, Scanlon
Goal: Clarify concepts by providing necessary and sufficient conditions
Form:
X is F if and only if:
1. Condition C₁
2. Condition C₂
3. Condition C₃
Where these conditions are:
- Individually necessary (each required)
- Jointly sufficient (all together enough)
Example (traditional analysis of knowledge):
S knows that P if and only if:
1. S believes that P
2. P is true
3. S is justified in believing P
Method: Test against counterexamples (Gettier cases refuted the above)
Goal: Reveal the logical form underlying natural language
Russell's Theory of Descriptions:
Surface form: "The present King of France is bald"
Logical form: ∃x(Kx ∧ ∀y(Ky → y=x) ∧ Bx)
"There exists exactly one King of France and he is bald"
Significance: Explains how meaningful sentences can be false
(The existential claim is false)
Applications:
Purpose: Test philosophical claims by imagining scenarios
Structure:
Famous Examples:
Method: Balance principles and intuitions iteratively
REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM
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1. Start with intuitions about particular cases
↓
2. Formulate general principles that explain intuitions
↓
3. Test principles against new cases
↓
4. If conflict: revise principles OR revise intuitions
↓
5. Repeat until stable equilibrium
The Problem: "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative; "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial. Why, if both refer to Venus?
Solution:
| Concept | German | Definition | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reference (Bedeutung) | Bedeutung | The object denoted | Venus |
| Sense (Sinn) | Sinn | Mode of presentation | "The evening star" vs. "The morning star" |
Compositionality Principle: The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts and how they are combined.
The Puzzle: What does "The present King of France" refer to?
Russell's Analysis: Definite descriptions are not referring expressions but quantified expressions.
"The F is G" =def
∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx)
"There is exactly one F, and it is G"
Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus):
Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations):
Direct Reference Theory:
Kripke's Arguments:
MODAL ARGUMENT
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"Aristotle" could have failed to be:
- The teacher of Alexander
- The author of the Nicomachean Ethics
- (any description)
But "Aristotle" could not have failed to be Aristotle.
Therefore, names ≠ descriptions.
EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT
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We can discover that Hesperus = Phosphorus.
This is an a posteriori necessary truth.
Identity statements with rigid designators are necessary if true.
Twin Earth Thought Experiment:
Conclusion: "Meanings ain't in the head"
Positions:
MIND-BODY POSITIONS
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DUALISM
├── Substance Dualism (Descartes)
│ └── Mind and body are distinct substances
└── Property Dualism
└── Mental properties distinct from physical
PHYSICALISM
├── Type Identity (Smart, Place)
│ └── Mental types = brain types
├── Functionalism (Putnam, Fodor)
│ └── Mental states = functional roles
├── Eliminativism (Churchland)
│ └── Folk psychology will be eliminated
└── Non-Reductive (Davidson)
└── Mental supervenes on physical but isn't reducible
NEUTRAL MONISM
└── Mental and physical are aspects of neutral stuff
Core Idea: Mental states defined by causal/functional roles, not intrinsic properties
FUNCTIONALIST ANALYSIS
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Pain =def the state that:
- Is typically caused by tissue damage
- Typically causes withdrawal behavior
- Typically causes distress
- Is typically avoided
- ...
Multiple Realizability: Pain could be realized in:
- C-fibers (humans)
- Silicon circuits (robots)
- Whatever plays the right role
Objections:
The Hard Problem (Chalmers):
Mary's Room (Jackson):
MARY'S ROOM ARGUMENT
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1. Mary knows all physical facts about color vision
2. Mary has never seen color (black/white room)
3. When Mary sees red for the first time, she learns something
4. Therefore, there are non-physical facts (qualia)
Responses:
- Ability hypothesis: She gains an ability, not knowledge
- Phenomenal concept strategy: Same facts, new concept
- Deny premise 3: She doesn't really learn new facts
Chinese Room (Searle):
CHINESE ROOM ARGUMENT
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1. Imagine someone in a room following rules to respond to Chinese
2. The person doesn't understand Chinese
3. But the system passes the Turing test
4. Therefore, syntax is not sufficient for semantics
5. Strong AI is false: computation ≠ understanding
Responses:
- Systems reply: The whole system understands
- Robot reply: Needs embodiment and interaction
- Brain simulator reply: What if it simulates neurons?
Modal Logic: Logic of possibility and necessity
| Symbol | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ◊P | Possibly P |
| □P | Necessarily P |
| ◊P ↔ ¬□¬P | Possibly P iff not necessarily not-P |
Possible Worlds Semantics:
Lewis's Modal Realism:
Positions:
PERSONAL IDENTITY THEORIES
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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY (Locke, Parfit)
├── Memory connections
├── Psychological continuity
└── Problem: Reduplication, branching
BIOLOGICAL CRITERION (Olson)
├── Same biological organism
└── Animalism: we are fundamentally animals
NO-SELF (Parfit)
├── Personal identity is not what matters
├── What matters: psychological continuity/connectedness
└── Relation R can hold without identity
Parfit's Teletransporter:
Counterfactual Theory (Lewis):
Problems:
Traditional Analysis: Knowledge = Justified True Belief
Gettier Cases:
GETTIER CASE
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Scenario:
1. Smith believes "Jones owns a Ford" (based on seeing Jones drive one)
2. Smith infers "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona"
3. Unknown to Smith: Jones doesn't own the Ford (borrowed)
4. But Brown happens to be in Barcelona
Result:
- Smith's belief is true
- Smith's belief is justified
- But Smith doesn't know!
Moral: JTB is not sufficient for knowledge
Responses:
The External World:
SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
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1. I cannot know that I am not a brain in a vat
2. If I cannot know I'm not a BIV, I cannot know I have hands
3. Therefore, I cannot know I have hands
Responses:
- Contextualism: Standards vary by context
- Relevant alternatives: BIV not relevant
- Externalism: Knowledge doesn't require ruling out skepticism
- Moorean shift: I know I have hands, therefore I'm not a BIV
Positions:
METAETHICAL LANDSCAPE
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COGNITIVISM (Moral claims are truth-apt)
├── Moral Realism
│ ├── Naturalism: moral facts = natural facts
│ └── Non-naturalism: sui generis moral properties
└── Error Theory: moral claims are systematically false
NON-COGNITIVISM (Moral claims are not truth-apt)
├── Emotivism: express attitudes
├── Prescriptivism: issue commands
└── Expressivism: express non-cognitive states
Trolley Problem (Foot, Thomson):
TROLLEY CASES
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SWITCH: Trolley heading toward 5 people.
You can flip switch to divert to 1 person.
Most say: permissible to flip switch.
FOOTBRIDGE: Trolley heading toward 5 people.
You can push large man off bridge to stop trolley.
Most say: impermissible to push.
Puzzle: Why the different intuitions if consequences are same?
Theories:
- Doctrine of Double Effect
- Act/Omission distinction
- Using vs. merely affecting
Rawls's Theory of Justice:
RAWLSIAN FRAMEWORK
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ORIGINAL POSITION
├── Hypothetical contract
├── Veil of ignorance: don't know your place in society
└── Rational choice behind the veil
TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
1. Liberty Principle: Equal basic liberties
2. Difference Principle: Inequalities only if they benefit worst-off
(With fair equality of opportunity)
Lexical priority: Liberty > Fair opportunity > Difference
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| A priori | Knowable independent of experience |
| A posteriori | Knowable only through experience |
| Necessary | True in all possible worlds |
| Contingent | True but could have been false |
| Analytic | True by virtue of meaning |
| Synthetic | True by virtue of the world |
| Supervenience | A-properties supervene on B-properties iff no A-difference without B-difference |
| Rigid designator | Expression that refers to same thing in all possible worlds |
| De re / de dicto | About the thing / about the saying |
| Token / Type | Instance / Kind |
| Qualia | Subjective, qualitative aspects of experience |
| Intentionality | Aboutness; mental states are about things |
thinkers/wittgenstein/, thinkers/frege/thoughts/consciousness/: Philosophy of mind debatesthoughts/knowledge/: Epistemology, skepticismthoughts/free_will/: Compatibilism debatesmethods.md: Conceptual analysis, logical analysis protocolsvocabulary.md: Technical terms glossaryfigures.md: Key philosophers with contributionsdebates.md: Central controversiessources.md: Primary texts and secondary literature