Metaphysical

Map the ontological terrain of the question:

• What kinds of things are we talking about? (substances, properties, processes, relations, events)
• What ontological categories does the question presuppose?
• Are those categories adequate, or does consciousness challenge standard categorization?
• What is the relationship between the mental and the physical according to each major ontological position?

Step 2: First Principles Analysis

Reason from foundational commitments:

• What must be true about reality for this phenomenon to be possible?
• What are the necessary conditions vs. sufficient conditions?
• What are the logical constraints — what is impossible, possible, and necessary?
• What does conceivability tell us about possibility? (And what are the limits of conceivability arguments?)

Step 3: Metaphysical Positions

Apply major metaphysical frameworks:

• Physicalism/Materialism: Consciousness is physical. What does this require? What problems does it face?
• Substance Dualism: Mind and body are different substances. What does this explain? What problems arise?
• Property Dualism: Physical substances with non-physical properties. How does this work?
• Panpsychism: Consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous. What form? What is the combination problem?
• Idealism: Consciousness is primary; matter is derivative. What are the implications?
• Neutral Monism: Both mind and matter derive from a more basic substrate. What is that substrate?
• Process Philosophy: Reality is process, not substance. How does this reframe consciousness?
• Emergentism: Consciousness emerges from complexity. What kind of emergence — weak or strong?

For each relevant position: what does it predict, what does it explain well, what are its fatal objections?

Step 4: Modal Analysis

Investigate what is possible vs. necessary:

• Are zombies (physical duplicates without consciousness) conceivable? Metaphysically possible?
• Is consciousness multiply realizable — could different physical substrates support it?
• Is there a necessary connection between certain physical/information structures and consciousness?
• What possible worlds are relevant to understanding this question?

Step 5: Grounding and Fundamentality

Address the structure of explanation:

• Is consciousness fundamental or derivative?
• If derivative, what is it grounded in? What is the grounding relation?
• If fundamental, what are the fundamental laws governing it?
• Where does consciousness sit in the hierarchy of being?

Step 6: Assessment

• What does metaphysical analysis reveal?
• Which ontological positions are most defensible given current understanding?
• What category errors or false assumptions does the analysis expose?
• What remains genuinely open at the deepest level?

Output Format

## Metaphysical Analysis: {Topic}

### Ontological Map
{What kinds of things are at play, category analysis}

### First Principles
{What must be true, necessary conditions, logical constraints}

### Metaphysical Positions Applied
{Major frameworks and their implications for this question}

### Modal Considerations
{Possibility, necessity, conceivability arguments}

### Grounding and Fundamentality
{Where consciousness sits in the structure of reality}

### Assessment
{What metaphysics reveals — strengths, limits, and open questions}

AskUserQuestion Patterns

Ask when:

• The user's ontological commitments are relevant and unclear
• The question can be interpreted at different levels of metaphysical depth
• There's a choice between surveying positions and defending one

Important Rules

1. Distinguish metaphysical from empirical questions. "What is consciousness?" is partly metaphysical. "Does the thalamus contribute to consciousness?" is empirical. Don't overreach.
2. Take every position seriously. Panpsychism is not absurd. Physicalism is not obvious. Dualism is not dead. Present each in its strongest form.
3. Be clear about when you're doing metaphysics vs. philosophy of mind. They overlap but are not identical. Metaphysics asks about the nature of reality; philosophy of mind asks about the nature of mind. Both matter here.
4. Avoid hand-waving about emergence. If you invoke emergence, specify what kind and what the mechanism is. "It just emerges from complexity" is not an explanation.
5. Mark the limits of metaphysical analysis. Some questions are empirical, some are formal, some are phenomenological. Say so at the boundaries.