Draft, negotiate, and ratify bilateral or multilateral agreements between ETHOS -- defining terms, shared protocols, dispute handling, and graduated engagement tiers -- through each ETHOS's own ACT process.
Without formal federation agreements, inter-ETHOS relationships are ad hoc -- built on personal connections and informal understandings that create inconsistency and ambiguity about what each unit has committed to. When relationships sour, there is no documented basis for accountability. This skill ensures multi-unit relationships are documented, mutually ratified, version-controlled, and reviewable -- the same structural discipline applied to intra-ETHOS agreements extended to the inter-unit level. It also prevents early agreements from becoming de facto standards that constrain later-joining ETHOS.
This skill applies to any ongoing relationship between two or more ETHOS that goes beyond one-time requests. Federation agreement types include:
One-time interactions use the cross-ethos-request skill. Federation agreements formalize ongoing patterns.
assets/federation-agreement-template.yaml. Drafting may be collaborative (simultaneous) or sequential (each ETHOS adds provisions). Disagreements are documented and negotiated within mandate limits.A federation agreement following assets/federation-agreement-template.yaml, containing: agreement ID, type, participating ETHOS, engagement tier, substantive terms, each ETHOS's negotiation mandate records, ratification records from each ETHOS, review schedule, amendment procedures, exit terms, and dispute resolution path. Registered in all participating ETHOS' registries.
Power asymmetry. A wealthier or larger ETHOS dictates terms during negotiation, leveraging its size to pressure smaller ETHOS into unfavorable provisions. Resistance: negotiation mandates are defined internally before negotiation begins, preventing mandate creep under social pressure. Each ETHOS's consent round evaluates terms independently. Size asymmetry is documented as context in the advice phase.
Urgency pressure. One ETHOS rushes ratification by framing delay as threatening the relationship. Resistance: each ETHOS controls its own consent timeline. No ETHOS can set deadlines for another's internal process. Urgency is documented but does not compress another ETHOS's consent process.
Precedent capture. Early agreements become de facto standards that constrain later-joining ETHOS. Resistance: new ETHOS joining an existing multilateral agreement negotiate their own terms and may propose amendments as a condition of joining. No ETHOS is bound by agreements it did not ratify through its own process.
Informal capture. Negotiators develop personal relationships that produce informal understandings outside the documented agreement. Resistance: only documented terms in the registered agreement are binding. Informal understandings have no governance standing.
Federation agreements are the primary mechanism for formalizing inter-ETHOS relationships. They reference cross-ethos-request (how the initial proposal was made), shared-resource-stewardship (how shared resources are governed within the federation framework), and inter-unit-liaison (how ongoing coordination roles are maintained). Changes to federation agreements must be announced to all participating ETHOS' registries simultaneously. New ETHOS joining a multilateral agreement negotiate and ratify on the same terms as the original parties.
Federation agreements operate within four engagement tiers (see assets/engagement-tiers.yaml):
Transitions between tiers require a federation agreement amendment ratified by all participating ETHOS.
Three SHUR communities -- Bali, Costa Rica, and Mexico -- decide to formalize a member transfer protocol. Currently, members who want to move between SHURs navigate an ad hoc process that varies each time.
Initiation. Amara, Bali's TH steward, submits a cross-ETHOS request to both Costa Rica and Mexico proposing a multilateral protocol for member transfers. Both SHURs acknowledge.
Mandate definition. Each SHUR's circle defines negotiation limits. Bali: negotiators can agree to notice periods between 14-45 days and housing arrangements up to 30 days. Costa Rica: negotiators can agree to notice periods of 21-60 days and require housing confirmation before transfer approval. Mexico: negotiators want maximum flexibility -- notice periods of 7-30 days, reflecting their more mobile community.
Parallel advice. Each SHUR gathers member input. Bali's members want clarity on resource access during transition. Costa Rica's members emphasize housing security. Mexico's members prioritize speed and simplicity.
Collaborative drafting. Amara, Diego (Costa Rica), and Valentina (Mexico) hold a joint drafting session. They draft a multilateral protocol covering: notice period, housing arrangements, resource access transition, and agreement field recognition.
Negotiation. The first draft proposes a 30-day notice period. Valentina objects -- Mexico's community is more transient, and 30 days is excessive. She proposes 14 days. Diego counters that 14 days is too short for Costa Rica to arrange housing. Compromise: 21-day standard notice with a flexibility clause allowing 14 days when documented circumstances warrant it (family emergency, employment change). All three negotiators confirm this falls within their mandates.
Ratification. Each SHUR runs consent. Bali: all members consent. Mexico: all consent. Costa Rica: in Round 1, 5 consent but Soren objects -- the housing guarantee language is too vague. He wants explicit commitment that the receiving SHUR confirms a housing arrangement before the transfer is approved. Integration round: the draft is amended to require housing confirmation within 10 days of transfer application. Round 2: all 7 Costa Rica members consent.
Registration. The "OmniOne Inter-SHUR Member Transfer Protocol" is registered in all three SHURs' registries as FED-OMNI-2026-002, with engagement tier set to "federate" for this domain. Review date: 12 months.
Edge case. Amara later realizes that Brazil's new SHUR wants to join the protocol. Brazil negotiates its own terms -- they propose a 28-day notice period for their larger community. The amendment process requires consent from all four SHURs. Brazil's terms are integrated without changing the existing parties' provisions (Brazil adds a SHUR-specific notice period). All four SHURs ratify the amendment.
A well-funded ETHOS proposes a federation agreement with three smaller ETHOS, offering significant resource contributions in exchange for favorable coordination terms. During the mandate definition phase, each smaller ETHOS defines what it can accept independently, before the joint negotiation begins. This structural separation ensures the funded ETHOS's offer does not shape the mandates. During negotiation, one smaller ETHOS's negotiator flags a term that would give the funded ETHOS priority access to shared governance data. The term is rejected because it violates the equal governance principle. The funded ETHOS's contribution is documented as resource commitment, not governance authority. The resulting agreement treats all parties equally regardless of financial capacity.
A regional disaster affects two of three SHURs in a multilateral federation agreement. The unaffected SHUR proposes an emergency amendment to redirect shared coordination resources toward disaster response. Emergency consent runs under compressed timelines (24-hour advice, 50% quorum) in each affected SHUR. The amendment is ratified within 48 hours. It includes a 30-day automatic expiry with a provision for full-process renewal if needed. The emergency does not justify bypassing any ETHOS's consent -- even under compression, each SHUR's internal process runs independently.
A charismatic ecosystem leader pressures all SHURs to ratify a federation agreement quickly, framing delay as "blocking community unity." Two SHURs consent quickly; the third, Mexico, has unresolved concerns about a provision on governance data sharing. The leader publicly characterizes Mexico's deliberation as obstruction. Mexico's steward responds by documenting the social pressure dynamic and reaffirming that each ETHOS controls its own consent timeline. Mexico takes an additional two weeks and produces a substantive amendment that all three SHURs ultimately adopt. The structural protection is that no external timeline pressure can compress an ETHOS's internal consent process.
Two ETHOS with fundamentally different governance philosophies -- one prioritizing individual autonomy, the other collective stewardship -- attempt to draft a federation agreement. Initial drafting sessions produce incompatible provisions. Rather than forcing compromise, the negotiators identify domains of genuine shared interest (member mobility, emergency mutual aid) and draft a narrower agreement covering only those domains. The engagement tier is set to "cooperate" rather than "federate," reflecting the honest scope of alignment. This is a structural success, not a failure -- the graduated engagement tiers allow productive relationships at appropriate depths.
OmniOne grows to 15 SHURs. The network has 12 active federation agreements of various types. Managing this complexity requires: a shared registry index (maintained by volunteer liaisons, not a central authority) for discoverability; domain-specific agreements rather than omnibus arrangements; and a maximum recommended participant count of 8 ETHOS per multilateral agreement to keep consent rounds manageable. ETHOS with less interaction remain at the "observe" or "cooperate" tier. The engagement tier system prevents premature formalization where it is not needed.
A government regulation requires formalized inter-organizational agreements to be registered with a regulatory body. One ETHOS adds a regulatory compliance field to its registry copy of the federation agreement. This is a local configuration -- the compliance field appears only in that ETHOS's registry entry. Other ETHOS are informed but not required to mirror it. The federation agreement's content is not modified for regulatory compliance; only the registry metadata changes. Compliance requirements remain jurisdiction-specific.
Three of ten ETHOS in a multilateral protocol announce exit simultaneously. Each files 90-day notice per the agreement's exit terms. The remaining seven ETHOS convene a mandatory review within 30 days. The review assesses: quorum viability (can seven ETHOS sustain the protocol?), commitment adequacy (do the remaining contributions cover operational needs?), and scope appropriateness (should the protocol be narrowed?). The seven ETHOS ratify an amended agreement reflecting the new participant set. The protocol continues without interruption for the remaining parties.