/em -postmortem — Honest Analysis of What Went Wrong
Command: /em:postmortem <event>
Not blame. Understanding. The failed deal, the missed quarter, the feature that flopped, the hire that didn't work out. What actually happened, why, and what changes as a result.
They become one of two things:
The blame session — someone gets scapegoated, defensive walls go up, actual causes don't get examined, and the same problem happens again in a different form.
The whitewash — "We learned a lot, we're going to do better, here are 12 vague action items." Nothing changes. Same problem, different quarter.
A real post-mortem is neither. It's a rigorous investigation into a system failure. Not "whose fault was it" but "what conditions made this outcome predictable in hindsight?"
The purpose: extract the maximum learning value from a failure so you can prevent recurrence and improve the system.
Before analysis: describe exactly what happened.
Precision matters. "We missed Q3 revenue" is not precise enough. "We closed $420K in new ARR vs $680K target — a $260K miss driven primarily by three deals that slipped to Q4 and one deal that was lost to a competitor" is precise.
The goal: get from what happened (the symptom) to why it happened (the root cause).
Standard bad 5 Whys:
→ Conclusion: Nothing to do. It's just enterprise.
Real 5 Whys:
→ Root cause: Qualification criteria outdated, no owner, no review process. → Fix: Update criteria, assign owner, add quarterly review.
The test for a good root cause: Could you prevent recurrence with a specific, concrete change? If yes, you've found something real.
Most events have multiple contributing factors. Not all are root causes.
Contributing factor: Made it worse, but isn't the core reason. If removed, the outcome might have been different — but the same class of problem would recur.
Root cause: The fundamental condition that made the outcome probable. Fix this, and this class of problem doesn't recur.
Example — failed hire:
The distinction matters. If you address only contributing factors, you'll have a different-looking but structurally identical failure next time.
Every failure has precursors. In hindsight, they're obvious. The value of this step is making them obvious prospectively.
Ask:
Common patterns:
This step is particularly important for systemic issues — "we didn't feel safe raising the concern" is a much deeper root cause than "the deal qualification was off."
Some failures happen despite correct decisions. Some happen because of incorrect decisions. Knowing the difference prevents both overcorrection and undercorrection.
For things out of control: what can be done to be more resilient to similar events? For things in control: what specifically needs to change?
Warning: "It was outside our control" is sometimes used to avoid accountability. Be rigorous.
Every post-mortem ends with a change register — specific commitments, owned and dated.
Bad action items:
Good action items:
For each action:
The most commonly skipped step. Post-mortems are useless if nobody checks whether the changes actually happened and actually worked.
Set a verification date: "We'll review whether qualification criteria have been updated and whether deal slippage rate has improved at the June board meeting."
Without this, post-mortems are theater.
EVENT: [Name and date]
EXPECTED: [What was supposed to happen]
ACTUAL: [What happened]
IMPACT: [Quantified]
TIMELINE
[Date]: [What happened or was visible]
[Date]: ...
5 WHYS
1. [Why did X happen?] → Because [Y]
2. [Why did Y happen?] → Because [Z]
3. [Why did Z happen?] → Because [A]
4. [Why did A happen?] → Because [B]
5. [Why did B happen?] → Because [ROOT CAUSE]
ROOT CAUSE: [One clear sentence]
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
• [Factor] — how it contributed
• [Factor] — how it contributed
WARNING SIGNS MISSED
• [Signal visible at what date] — why it wasn't acted on
WHAT WAS IN CONTROL: [List]
WHAT WASN'T: [List]
CHANGE REGISTER
| Action | Owner | Due Date | Verification |
|--------|-------|----------|-------------|
| [Specific change] | [Name] | [Date] | [How to verify] |
VERIFICATION DATE: [Date of check-in]
Blame is cheap. Understanding is hard.
The goal isn't to establish that someone made a mistake. The goal is to understand why the system produced that outcome — so the system can be improved.
"The salesperson didn't qualify the deal properly" is blame. "Our qualification framework hadn't been updated when we moved upmarket, and no one owned keeping it current" is understanding.
The first version fires or shames someone. The second version builds a more resilient organization.
Both might be true simultaneously. The distinction is: which one actually prevents recurrence?