Use when mapping security findings to FDA medical device cybersecurity guidance during capability development - provides premarket/postmarket requirements, severity classification framework, SBOM requirements, and coordinated disclosure guidance for healthcare compliance
Help capability developers map security findings to FDA medical device cybersecurity requirements for regulatory compliance and patient safety.
FDA Premarket Cybersecurity Guidance (September 2023) establishes cybersecurity requirements for medical device 510(k) submissions, including SBOM documentation, vulnerability management plans, and coordinated disclosure procedures.
When to Use
Use this skill when:
Scanning medical devices or healthcare systems for security vulnerabilities
Preparing premarket submissions (510(k)) with cybersecurity documentation
Assessing postmarket surveillance requirements for vulnerability disclosure
Classifying vulnerabilities using FDA's exploitability + patient harm framework
Creating Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for medical device submissions
Determining coordinated vulnerability disclosure timelines for medical devices
関連 Skill
Critical Rules
1. Use FDA Severity Classification (Dual-Axis)
FDA requires both exploitability AND patient harm assessment, not just CVSS scores.
FDA Severity
Exploitability
Patient Harm
Action Required
Critical
High
Severe/Death
Immediate patch
High
High
Moderate harm
30-day timeline
Medium
Low
Moderate harm
90-day timeline
Low
Low
Minimal/no harm
Standard patch cycle
2. Premarket vs Postmarket Requirements
Phase
Requirements
Documentation
Premarket
Cybersecurity plan, threat model, SBOM
510(k) submission package
Postmarket
Vulnerability monitoring, patch lifecycle
Annual postmarket reports
3. SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) Requirements
All medical device software MUST include SBOM documentation for 510(k) submissions:
Component name, version, supplier
Known vulnerabilities (CVE references)
License information
Dependency relationships
Format: SPDX 2.3+ or CycloneDX 1.4+
Quick Reference
Premarket Requirements (510(k) Submission)
Document
FDA Requirement
Purpose
Cybersecurity Plan
Mandatory
Risk management and threat model
SBOM
Mandatory
Software component inventory
Vulnerability Disclosure
Mandatory
Coordinated disclosure process
Security Testing Report
Recommended
Penetration testing results
Access Control Matrix
Recommended
Authentication/authorization
Data Protection Plan
Mandatory
Encryption and data integrity
Postmarket Requirements
Requirement
Timeline
Regulatory Reference
Vulnerability monitoring
Continuous
21 CFR 822
Security updates
Risk-based
FDA Postmarket Guidance
Incident reporting
30 days
MDR (Medical Device Reports)
Annual postmarket report
Yearly
21 CFR 822
Vulnerability Severity (Patient Harm)
Patient Harm Level
Description
Examples
Severe/Death
Could result in death or serious injury
Insulin pump dosage manipulation
Moderate
Could result in temporary injury
False alarm suppression on monitor
Minimal
No direct patient harm
Delayed diagnostic result display
None
No patient impact
Administrative interface cosmetic bug
Mapping Security Findings to FDA Requirements
Cloud Security (Medical Device Backend)
Vulnerability Pattern
Patient Harm
FDA Severity
Premarket Requirement
Postmarket Action
Public S3 with PHI
Severe
Critical
Data protection plan
Immediate patching
Exposed API (device data)
Moderate
High
Access control matrix
30-day disclosure
Missing MFA (clinician UI)
Moderate
High
Authentication design
Security update
Weak encryption (at-rest)
Severe
Critical
Encryption standards
Immediate remediation
CloudTrail disabled
Minimal
Medium
Audit logging plan
90-day timeline
Medical Device Interface Security
Vulnerability Pattern
Patient Harm
FDA Severity
Premarket Requirement
Postmarket Action
Unauthenticated device control
Severe
Critical
Access control matrix
Recall possible
Weak device pairing
Moderate
High
Authentication design
Coordinated patch
Cleartext communication
Severe
Critical
Encryption requirements
Immediate update
Command injection in firmware
Severe
Critical
Security testing report
Recall possible
Default credentials
High
Critical
Password policy
Mandatory update
Network & Infrastructure
Vulnerability Pattern
Patient Harm
FDA Severity
Premarket Requirement
Postmarket Action
Open ports on device
Moderate
Medium
Network architecture
Risk assessment
Missing network isolation
Moderate
High
Network segmentation
Configuration fix
Vulnerable TLS version
Moderate
High
Encryption standards
Security update
Exposed debug interface
High
Critical
Security design
Immediate patch
Software Supply Chain
Vulnerability Pattern
Patient Harm
FDA Severity
Premarket Requirement
Postmarket Action
Vulnerable dependency (CVE)
Variable
Risk-based
SBOM documentation
Assess + patch if high
Outdated OS/framework
Moderate
Medium
SBOM + update plan
Planned update
Unsigned firmware
High
Critical
Code signing
Mandatory signing
Leaked credentials in code
Severe
Critical
Secret management
Immediate rotation
Decision Trees
"Which FDA Requirement Applies?"
Is this a new device submission?
├─ Yes → Premarket (510(k))
│ ├─ Need cybersecurity plan?
│ │ └─ YES - Mandatory for all devices (2023 guidance)
│ ├─ Need SBOM?
│ │ └─ YES - Mandatory (SPDX 2.3+ or CycloneDX 1.4+)
│ ├─ Need threat model?
│ │ └─ YES - Risk-based approach
│ └─ Need security testing?
│ └─ RECOMMENDED - Penetration testing report
│
└─ No → Postmarket
├─ Is this a vulnerability?
│ ├─ Critical (patient harm + high exploitability)?
│ │ └─ Immediate disclosure + patch
│ ├─ High severity?
│ │ └─ 30-day coordinated disclosure
│ └─ Medium/Low severity?
│ └─ 90-day disclosure or standard cycle
│
└─ Need to report to FDA?
├─ Could cause death/serious injury?
│ └─ YES - MDR report within 30 days
└─ Requires device modification?
└─ Postmarket surveillance report
"What is the FDA Severity?"
Vulnerability detected:
Step 1: Assess Patient Harm
├─ Could cause death or serious injury?
│ └─ Patient Harm = SEVERE
├─ Could cause temporary/reversible injury?
│ └─ Patient Harm = MODERATE
├─ Could delay or degrade functionality?
│ └─ Patient Harm = MINIMAL
└─ No patient impact?
└─ Patient Harm = NONE
Step 2: Assess Exploitability
├─ Remotely exploitable + no auth required?
│ └─ Exploitability = HIGH
├─ Local access or authentication required?
│ └─ Exploitability = MEDIUM
└─ Requires physical access or complex conditions?
└─ Exploitability = LOW
Step 3: Determine FDA Severity
├─ SEVERE + HIGH → CRITICAL
├─ MODERATE/SEVERE + HIGH → HIGH
├─ MODERATE + LOW → MEDIUM
└─ MINIMAL/NONE + ANY → LOW
"Do I Need Coordinated Disclosure?"
Found vulnerability in deployed medical device:
Is it exploitable remotely?
├─ Yes → Coordinated disclosure required
│ ├─ CRITICAL severity (patient harm possible)?
│ │ └─ 0-day disclosure + immediate patch
│ ├─ HIGH severity?
│ │ └─ 30-day coordinated timeline
│ └─ MEDIUM/LOW severity?
│ └─ 90-day coordinated timeline
│
└─ No (local/physical only)
├─ Could cause patient harm?
│ └─ Report to manufacturer + standard patch cycle
└─ No patient harm?
└─ Standard vulnerability disclosure
Common Mistakes
1. Using Only CVSS Scores
Wrong: Classifying vulnerability as "CVSS 7.5 = High severity"
FDA requires patient harm assessment, not just technical exploitability.