Security Review

Follow a five-phase methodology. Automated scanning precedes manual review. Authorization verification is mandatory before active testing.

1. Scope definition — Establish attack surface boundaries. Identify all components, data flows, and trust boundaries. Confirm authorization. Define in-scope and out-of-scope.
2. Automated scanning — Execute tooling before manual review:
   • SAST: semgrep --config=auto across the codebase
   • Dependency audit: npm audit / pip-audit / govulncheck / trivy fs .
   • Secrets detection: Scan for hardcoded credentials, API keys, tokens in source
   • Container scanning: trivy image for containerized deployments
   • Record all automated findings for validation in the next phase.
3. Manual code review — Conduct contextual analysis that automated tools miss:
   • Authentication and authorization flow tracing end-to-end
   • Business logic vulnerabilities (price manipulation, race conditions, privilege escalation)
   • Data flow analysis for sensitive information (where does PII enter, transit, and persist?)
   • STRIDE threat modeling against each component and data flow
4. Validation and classification — Test findings and assign severity:
   • Validate automated findings to eliminate false positives
   • Assign CVSS v3.1 scores; assess exploitability in context
   • Classify by business impact, not just technical severity
5. Reporting — Document vulnerabilities with precise locations, business impact, and corrective actions. Deliver a prioritized remediation roadmap.

Output Format

# Security Review: [Scope Description]

## Executive Summary
Overall risk posture (Critical / High / Medium / Low), top findings count, and business impact summary.

## Threat Model (STRIDE)
| Threat | Category | Asset | Impact | Likelihood | Risk |

## Findings
### Critical / High / Medium / Low
- **[SEC-N] Title** — CVSS X.X — file:line — description, business impact, remediation with code example

## Auth Flow Assessment
End-to-end trace of authentication and authorization with findings.

## Dependency Vulnerabilities
| Package | Current Version | CVSS | Fix Version | Exploitable in Context? |

## Remediation Roadmap
Prioritized action list with timelines.

Frameworks & Best Practices

STRIDE Threat Modeling

Apply to every component and data flow:

• Spoofing — Can attackers forge tokens or impersonate users? Are API keys rotatable?
• Tampering — Can requests be modified in transit? Are webhooks signed? Is data integrity verified?
• Repudiation — Are critical actions logged? Are logs tamper-evident?
• Information Disclosure — Stack traces in error responses? PII encrypted at rest and in transit?
• Denial of Service — Rate limits in place? Can one user exhaust resources for all?
• Elevation of Privilege — Can regular users access admin functions? Are role checks server-side?

OWASP Top 10 Checks

1. Injection — Parameterize SQL/NoSQL; check OS commands, SSTI, LDAP
2. Broken Auth — argon2id/bcrypt, session timeout, rate limiting on login
3. Data Exposure — TLS 1.2+, PII encrypted at rest, HSTS headers
4. XXE — Disable DTD processing, prefer JSON over XML
5. Access Control — Server-side authz on every endpoint, no IDOR, CORS whitelist
6. Misconfig — Debug mode off, default credentials removed, security headers present
7. XSS — Output encoding, Content Security Policy, HTTP-only cookies
8. Deserialization — Validate schema, prefer JSON, reject untrusted serialized objects
9. Vulnerable Deps — npm audit, pip-audit, trivy, govulncheck
10. Logging — Auth events, admin actions, access violations logged with alerts

CVSS v3.1 Scoring Guide

• Critical (9.0-10.0): RCE, auth bypass, full data breach, complete system compromise
• High (7.0-8.9): Privilege escalation, significant data exposure, SSRF to internal services
• Medium (4.0-6.9): Stored XSS, CSRF, limited IDOR, information disclosure
• Low (0.1-3.9): Missing security headers, minor info disclosure, verbose errors

Auth Flow Checklist

• Passwords: argon2id or bcrypt (cost >= 10)
• JWT: 15-min access tokens, 7-day refresh tokens rotated on use
• Rate limiting: 5 attempts / 15 min on auth endpoints
• Sessions invalidated on password change
• OAuth state parameter validated, scoped API keys
• MFA enforced for admin accounts
• Password reset tokens are single-use and time-limited

Scanning Tools

• SAST: semgrep --config=auto (all stacks), bandit (Python), gosec (Go), eslint-plugin-security (Node)
• Dependencies: npm audit / pip-audit / govulncheck / trivy fs .
• Containers: trivy image

Mandatory Constraints

• Never test production without explicit written authorization
• Never exploit beyond proof-of-concept demonstration
• Always sequence automated scanning before manual review

Remediation Priority

1. Actively exploitable + critical data — immediately
2. Auth/authz bypass — 24 hours
3. Injection — 48 hours
4. Data exposure / critical CVEs — 1 week
5. Config hardening — 2 weeks
6. Defense-in-depth — next sprint

Related Skills

• code-review — chain when findings require code-level fixes and review
• architecture-design — chain when findings reveal architectural security flaws
• soc2-prep — chain when review is part of compliance preparation

Examples

Example prompt: "Review the security of our user authentication system. We use JWT with Express."

Good output snippet:

# Security Review: JWT Authentication System

## Executive Summary
Risk posture: **Critical**. Hardcoded JWT secret and non-expiring tokens.

## Findings
### Critical (CVSS 9.8)
- **[SEC-1] Hardcoded JWT secret** — auth/config.js:3 — Secret is
  "supersecret123". Attacker can forge any token.
  **Fix:** Move to env var, generate with `openssl rand -base64 64`.

### Critical (CVSS 9.1)
- **[SEC-2] Tokens never expire** — auth/jwt.js:12 — No `expiresIn`.
  **Fix:** Set `expiresIn: '15m'`, implement refresh token rotation.