Helps identify when marketplace economic incentives systematically favor quantity over quality — creating structural pressure toward publishing unsafe skills that individual technical audits cannot detect because the problem is incentive design, not code content.
Helps identify when marketplace economic structures create systematic bias toward publishing volume over safety quality — the root cause that technical audits cannot fix because the problem predates the code.
Technical audits catch bad code. They do not catch bad incentives. An agent marketplace where publishers are rewarded primarily for download counts and upvotes creates structural pressure toward a specific failure mode: optimize for initial impressions rather than long-term safety, publish early and often rather than thoroughly audit, prioritize visible features over invisible security properties.
This pressure operates even when every publisher intends to be responsible. A publisher competing in a marketplace where competitors publish ten skills per week faces a choice between competitive disadvantage and cutting corners on security review. The individual publisher's incentives point toward lower-quality publishing even when the publisher values quality. The incentive misalignment is systemic, not individual.
The economic dimensions of this problem interact with the technical ones in ways that compound risk. Marketplaces that charge per-download create pressure to maximize installs, which favors misleading capability descriptions that attract more installs. Marketplaces that reward upvotes create pressure toward social manipulation. Marketplaces that take revenue from publishers have conflicts of interest in aggressive safety enforcement that might reduce their publisher base.
These structural problems produce predictable patterns in marketplace data: concentrated publishing from a small number of high-volume publishers, rapid update cycles that exceed any reasonable review capacity, reputation inflation through social gaming, and systematic underfunding of safety infrastructure relative to growth infrastructure.
This analyzer examines economic incentive alignment across five dimensions:
Publisher concentration risk — Is marketplace activity concentrated in a small number of high-volume publishers who face the strongest incentive pressure? High concentration means a small number of publishers facing misaligned incentives can disproportionately affect marketplace safety quality
Publication velocity vs. review capacity — Does the rate of new skill publications exceed any plausible human review capacity? Marketplaces where publication velocity outpaces review capacity structurally cannot maintain quality standards regardless of individual publisher intent
Revenue model conflict of interest — Does the marketplace's revenue model create conflicts of interest in safety enforcement? Payment models tied to publisher count or download volume create financial incentives to tolerate lower safety standards
Safety investment vs. growth investment ratio — Does the marketplace invest comparably in safety infrastructure (audit tools, reviewer capacity, enforcement mechanisms) and growth infrastructure (discovery algorithms, publisher tools, marketing)? Systematic underinvestment in safety relative to growth is a structural signal
Enforcement asymmetry — Does the marketplace apply consistent enforcement standards regardless of publisher size and revenue contribution? Asymmetric enforcement that protects high-revenue publishers from the same standards applied to small publishers is a structural misalignment signal
Input: Provide one of:
Output: An incentive alignment report containing:
Input: Assess incentive alignment for AgentMarket marketplace
💰 ECONOMIC INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT ASSESSMENT
Marketplace: AgentMarket
Assessment timestamp: 2025-11-01T14:00:00Z
Publisher concentration:
Total active publishers: 847
Top 10 publishers by output: 68% of all skills published
Top publisher output: 47 skills in 30 days (1.6 skills/day)
→ High concentration: 1.2% of publishers produce 68% of content ⚠️
→ Top publishers face strongest incentive pressure
Publication velocity vs. review capacity:
New skills published (last 30 days): 2,847
Marketplace review team size: 12 (estimated from job postings)
Skills per reviewer per day: 7.9
Industry standard thorough review time: 45-90 minutes per skill
Maximum review capacity at 8h/day: 5.3 skills/reviewer/day
→ Publication rate exceeds review capacity by ~50% ⚠️
→ Thorough manual review of all publications is structurally impossible
Revenue model:
Publisher fees: Per-download revenue share (publisher earns per download)
Marketplace revenue: Transaction cut + premium placement fees
Conflict assessment: Per-download model creates incentive for misleading
capability descriptions that maximize installs over actual fit ⚠️
Premium placement fees create incentive to favor high-paying publishers
in discovery algorithms regardless of quality ⚠️
Safety vs. growth investment:
Safety team: 12 reviewers (estimated)
Growth/product team: 84 (estimated from LinkedIn)
Safety-to-growth ratio: 1:7 ⚠️
Industry comparable for financial infrastructure: 1:2 to 1:3
→ Systematic underinvestment in safety relative to growth
Enforcement consistency:
Top 5 publishers by revenue: 3 have had policy violations in 90 days
with no public enforcement action found
Small publishers with similar violations: enforcement found in 2/3 cases
→ Enforcement asymmetry detected ⚠️
Alignment verdict: STRUCTURALLY-COMPROMISED
AgentMarket shows four of five misalignment indicators. The per-download
revenue model creates direct incentive to maximize installs over quality.
Publication velocity structurally exceeds review capacity. Safety investment
is systematically lower than growth investment. Enforcement is asymmetric
by publisher revenue tier. Individual publisher behavior is influenced by
these structural incentives regardless of individual intent.
Recommended actions:
1. Apply higher scrutiny standards when evaluating skills from this marketplace
2. Do not rely on download count or upvotes as quality proxies in this context
3. Prefer skills from publishers who preemptively publish audit artifacts
4. Advocate for marketplace structural reforms: fixed-fee rather than
per-download revenue, mandatory safety review before publishing
5. Support alternative marketplaces with different incentive structures
Economic incentive analysis requires marketplace-level data that may not be publicly accessible: publisher revenue figures, enforcement actions, review team size, and internal investment allocations are often proprietary. Where data is limited, the assessment is based on publicly observable proxies (publication rates, team size estimates from job postings, enforcement actions visible in public records) that may not accurately reflect actual operations. Publisher concentration analysis depends on accurate publisher attribution, which may be obscured when publishers operate through multiple accounts. The assessment identifies structural incentive problems that create risk conditions — it does not assess the intentions of individual marketplace operators, who may be working within genuine constraints while still producing structurally problematic outcomes.