Grad Contract Theory

• Both parties have symmetric information and trust is established (no incentive problem)
• The relationship is a one-shot anonymous transaction with no contractual enforcement
• Behavioral factors (reciprocity, intrinsic motivation) dominate monetary incentives

Assumptions

IRON LAW: The optimal contract balances risk-sharing against incentive
provision — full insurance destroys incentives, full incentives impose
unbearable risk. There is no contract that achieves first-best when
information is asymmetric.

• The principal is risk-neutral; the agent is risk-averse (standard setup)
• The agent's action (effort) or type is private information
• Output is a noisy signal of the agent's effort: x = f(e) + epsilon
• Both parties are rational and can commit to the contract terms
• Courts can verify output but not effort (contractibility constraint)

Methodology

Step 1 — Classify the Information Problem Determine whether the core issue is moral hazard (hidden action after contracting), adverse selection (hidden type before contracting), or both. Identify who is the principal and who is the agent.

Step 2 — Specify Constraints Write down: (1) the Incentive Compatibility constraint (IC) — the agent prefers the intended action/type revelation; (2) the Participation Constraint (PC/IR) — the agent accepts the contract over the outside option; (3) Limited Liability (LL) if applicable — payments cannot go below zero.

Step 3 — Solve the Optimal Contract For moral hazard: maximize principal's expected profit subject to IC and PC. The optimal wage schedule w(x) satisfies the Holmstrom informativeness principle — pay should depend on output only insofar as it is informative about effort. For adverse selection: design a menu of contracts that induces self-selection (screening). Expect distortion at the bottom (inefficient allocation for low types) and efficiency at the top.

Step 4 — Assess Completeness and Renegotiation Check whether the contract is complete (covers all verifiable contingencies) or incomplete (residual rights matter). If incomplete, apply Hart's property rights approach: allocate residual control rights to the party whose investment is most important. Consider renegotiation-proofness.

Output Format

## Contract Design Analysis: [Context]

### Information Problem
- **Type**: Moral hazard / Adverse selection / Both
- **Principal**: [who]
- **Agent**: [who]
- **Hidden variable**: [effort level / agent type / quality]

### Constraints
| Constraint                  | Expression           | Binding? |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Incentive Compatibility     |                      |          |
| Participation (IR)          |                      |          |
| Limited Liability           |                      |          |

### Optimal Contract Structure
- **Fixed component**: [base salary / premium]
- **Variable component**: [bonus / piece rate / deductible]
- **Informativeness**: [which signals are used and why]

### First-Best vs. Second-Best Gap
- **First-best outcome**: [what would happen with full information]
- **Second-best distortion**: [what is sacrificed]
- **Welfare loss**: [qualitative or quantitative]

### Recommendation
[Contract terms and implementation guidance]

Gotchas

• Multi-tasking (Holmstrom-Milgrom): incentivizing one measurable task crowds out effort on unmeasurable tasks — strong incentives can be counterproductive
• Ratchet effect: if the principal updates expectations based on past performance, the agent strategically underperforms early
• Career concerns (Holmstrom 1999) can substitute for explicit incentives — young agents work hard to build reputation even without bonuses
• Limited liability constraints shift power to the agent and can require the principal to leave rents (efficiency wages)
• In repeated relationships, relational contracts (self-enforcing, not court-enforced) often dominate formal contracts
• Intrinsic motivation can be crowded out by extrinsic incentives (Benabou-Tirole) — paying volunteers may reduce their effort

References

• Holmstrom, B. (1979). "Moral Hazard and Observability." Bell Journal of Economics.
• Hart, O. & Moore, J. (1990). "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm." Journal of Political Economy.
• Laffont, J.-J. & Martimort, D. (2002). The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model.
• Bolton, P. & Dewatripont, M. (2005). Contract Theory. MIT Press.