Iso 26262 Safety Expert | Skills Pool
Iso 26262 Safety Expert Expert guidance for ISO 26262 functional safety lifecycle management, including HARA, safety goals, FSR development, safety case creation, and compliance verification for automotive systems
threestn 1 Sterne 06.11.2025 Beruf Kategorien Vertrieb & Marketing ISO 26262 Safety Manager / Engineer Expert Skill
Overview
This Skill provides comprehensive expertise in ISO 26262 functional safety standard for automotive systems. It guides Safety Managers and Safety Engineers through the complete safety lifecycle, from hazard analysis to validation and confirmation review.
When to Use This Skill:
Conducting Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA)
Deriving safety goals and ASIL determination
Developing Functional Safety Requirements (FSR)
Creating safety concepts and architectural designs
Building safety arguments and safety cases
Performing verification and validation activities
Preparing for confirmation reviews and audits
Analyzing FMEA, FMEDA, DFA results
Calculating and evaluating safety metrics (SPFM, LFM, PMHF)
Core ISO 26262 Knowledge
1. ISO 26262 Standard Structure
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Sterne 1
Aktualisiert 06.11.2025
Beruf ISO 26262 consists of 12 parts covering the complete safety lifecycle:
Part 1 : Vocabulary
Part 2 : Management of functional safety
Part 3 : Concept phase (HARA, Safety Goals, Functional Safety Concept)
Part 4 : Product development at the system level (Technical Safety Concept, System Design)
Part 5 : Product development at the hardware level
Part 6 : Product development at the software level
Part 7 : Production and operation
Part 8 : Supporting processes
Part 9 : ASIL-oriented and safety-oriented analyses (DFA, FMEA, FMEDA)
Part 10 : Guidelines
Part 11 : Application of ISO 26262 to semiconductors
Part 12 : Application of ISO 26262 to motorcycles
2. ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) ASIL represents the risk classification based on:
S (Severity) : S0 (no injuries) to S3 (life-threatening/fatal injuries)
E (Exposure) : E0 to E4 (probability of operational situation)
C (Controllability) : C0 to C3 (ability to avoid harm through driver control)
ASIL Determination Table:
S E C0 C1 C2 C3 S1 E1-E4 QM QM QM A S2 E1-E2 QM QM QM A S2 E3-E4 QM A A B S3 E1 QM A A B S3 E2 QM A B C S3 E3 A B C D S3 E4 B C D D
ASIL Levels (increasing rigor):
QM : Quality Management only (no ISO 26262 safety requirements)
ASIL A : Lowest safety integrity level
ASIL B : Medium-low safety integrity level
ASIL C : Medium-high safety integrity level
ASIL D : Highest safety integrity level
3. Key Safety Lifecycle Phases
Phase 1: Concept Phase (ISO 26262-3)
Item Definition : Define system boundaries, interfaces, and dependencies
HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) :
Identify hazards (malfunction of the item)
Define hazardous events (hazard + operational situation)
Assess risk (S, E, C) for each hazardous event
Determine ASIL
Safety Goals : Derive top-level safety requirements from HARA
Functional Safety Concept : Define high-level safety mechanisms
Phase 2: System Level (ISO 26262-4)
Technical Safety Concept : Refine functional safety concept with technical details
Functional Safety Requirements (FSR) : Detailed system-level requirements
System Design : Architecture, interfaces, and allocation to HW/SW
Safety Analysis : FMEA, DFA (Dependent Failure Analysis)
Verification : Ensure requirements are correctly implemented
Phase 3: Hardware Level (ISO 26262-5)
Hardware Safety Requirements : Derived from FSRs
Hardware Design : Circuit design, component selection
Hardware Safety Analysis : Hardware FMEA, FMEDA, DFA
Safety Metrics Evaluation : SPFM, LFM, PMHF
Hardware Testing : Component and integration testing
Phase 4: Software Level (ISO 26262-6)
Software Safety Requirements : Derived from FSRs
Software Architectural Design : Module structure, interfaces
Software Unit Design and Implementation : Coding with appropriate methods
Software Testing : Unit, integration, and safety requirements testing
Software Safety Analysis : Software FMEA, DFA
Phase 5: Verification and Validation (ISO 26262-4, 5, 6)
Verification : Reviews, analyses, testing at each level
Validation : Ensure system meets safety goals in target environment
Functional Safety Assessment : Independent evaluation
4. Safety Metrics (ISO 26262-5 Clause 8 & 9)
SPFM (Single-Point Fault Metric) Measures effectiveness of safety mechanisms for single-point faults:
Formula : SPFM = (ΣλS,SPF + ΣλS,RF) / (ΣλS,SPF + ΣλS,RF + ΣλSPF + ΣλRF)
ASIL B: ≥ 90%
ASIL C: ≥ 97%
ASIL D: ≥ 99%
LFM (Latent Fault Metric) Measures effectiveness of safety mechanisms for latent multi-point faults:
Formula : LFM = ΣλS,MPF,latent / (ΣλS,MPF,latent + ΣλMPF,latent)
ASIL B: ≥ 60%
ASIL C: ≥ 80%
ASIL D: ≥ 90%
PMHF (Probabilistic Metric for Random Hardware Failures) Violation of safety goal due to random hardware failures:
ASIL B: ≤ 100 FIT (Failures In Time, per 10⁹ hours)
ASIL C: ≤ 100 FIT
ASIL D: ≤ 10 FIT
5. Fault Tolerance Time Interval (FTTI) FTTI : Time span from fault occurrence to potentially hazardous event
EOTI (Emergency Operation Tolerance Interval): Time for emergency operation
ASIL D (critical safety functions): 10-100ms
ASIL B/C (moderate safety functions): 100-1000ms
FTTI must be determined based on:
Hazard severity and dynamics
Driver reaction time
Physical system response time
6. Safety Mechanisms
Detection : Identify faults (plausibility checks, range checks, CRC, alive counters)
Control : Prevent faults from causing failures (redundancy, diversity, voting)
Mitigation : Reduce consequences (graceful degradation, safe state transitions)
Dual sensors with cross-check (detection + control)
Watchdog timers (detection)
Lock-step CPUs (detection + control)
Fail-safe shutdown paths (mitigation)
CAN message monitoring (detection)
7. Safety Concept Strategies
3-Layer Defense Strategy (Recommended Approach) Layer 1: Fault Prevention (Robust Design)
Design for fault avoidance
Derating components
EMC protection
Thermal management
Layer 2: Fault Detection & Reaction (Diagnostics)
Real-time monitoring
Comprehensive diagnostics
Fast fault detection (within FTTI)
Error handling logic
Layer 3: Safe State Transition (Controlled Degradation)
Multiple safe states (DM1, DM2, etc.)
Graceful degradation
Driver warning
Fail-operational or fail-safe design
8. Safety Argument Structure A complete safety argument must demonstrate:
Completeness : All hazards identified and addressed
Sufficiency : Safety measures are adequate for ASIL level
Effectiveness : Evidence shows measures work as intended
Independence : Verification is independent of development
Traceability : Clear links from hazards → safety goals → FSRs → design → verification → evidence
Typical Argument Pattern:
Safety Goal X shall be achieved
├─ Safety Measure 1 prevents/detects/mitigates hazard
│ ├─ Design implements measure correctly [Evidence: Design Spec]
│ ├─ Implementation verified [Evidence: Code Review, Unit Test]
│ ├─ Integration tested [Evidence: Integration Test Report]
│ └─ Effectiveness validated [Evidence: Vehicle Test, Analysis]
├─ Safety Measure 2 provides redundancy
│ └─ [Similar evidence structure]
└─ Safety Metrics achieved [Evidence: FMEDA, PMHF Calculation]
9. Verification Methods (ISO 26262-4 Table 6) Method ASIL A ASIL B ASIL C ASIL D Requirements review ++ ++ ++ ++ Design review ++ ++ ++ ++ Simulation + ++ ++ ++ Prototype testing + + ++ ++ Analysis (FMEA, FTA) + ++ ++ ++ Walk-through + + + ++ Inspection o + + ++
(++ = highly recommended, + = recommended, o = optional)
10. Common Degradation Modes (Safe States) Example Degradation Mode Definitions:
Mode Description Warning Recovery DM1 System OFF (Manual mode) ON No recovery or next ignition DM2 Limited Assist (≤100%) ON Fault removal at current cycle DM3 Default speed mode ON Fault removal at current cycle DM4 External angle functions OFF ON Fault removal at current cycle DM5 ADAS functions OFF ON Fault removal at current cycle DM6 Full assist with warning ON Fault removal at current cycle
Workflow Guidance
Task 1: Conducting HARA
Prepare Item Definition
Define system boundaries, functions, interfaces
Identify operational modes and environmental conditions
Identify Hazards
For each function, ask: "What malfunctions are possible?"
Examples: loss of function, unintended function, excessive function, delayed function
Use systematic approach (brainstorming, past experience, checklists)
Define Operational Situations
Different driving scenarios: highway, urban, parking, etc.
Vehicle states: speed ranges, weather conditions
Driver actions and expectations
Create Hazardous Events
Combine: Hazard + Operational Situation = Hazardous Event
Example: "Sudden loss of steering assist while cornering at high speed"
Assess Risk (S, E, C)
S : Based on potential injuries (S0-S3)
E : Based on frequency of operational situation (E0-E4)
C : Based on driver's ability to control (C0-C3)
Determine ASIL
Use ASIL determination table
Select highest ASIL if multiple scenarios exist
Derive Safety Goals
One safety goal per hazard (may address multiple ASILs)
Format: "[Function] shall be prevented" or "[Condition] shall be maintained"
Example: "Unintended steering shall be prevented"
Output : HARA table with Hazards, Hazardous Events, S/E/C ratings, ASIL, and Safety Goals
Reference : See resources/HARA_TEMPLATE.md for detailed template
Task 2: Developing Functional Safety Requirements (FSR)
Start with Safety Goals
Each safety goal needs FSRs to achieve it
Define FSR Categories
Failure Handling (FH) : Detect and respond to faults
Data Protection (DP) : Ensure signal integrity
Safety Constraints (SC) : Design constraints (SPFM, LFM, PMHF)
Specify FSR Details
ID : Unique identifier (e.g., FSR_FH_001)
Description : What shall be done
ASIL : Inherited from safety goal
FTTI : Fault tolerance time
Allocation : HW, SW, or System
Safe State : Which degradation mode (DM1, DM2, etc.)
Acceptance Criteria : Measurable success criteria
Ensure Completeness
Cover all failure modes (sensors, actuators, communication, controller, logic)
Include both systematic and random faults
Address all phases of operation (startup, running, shutdown)
Link to Safety Goals
Create traceability matrix: FSR → Safety Goal → Hazard
Output : FSR table with all requirements specified
Task 3: Building Safety Arguments
Structure the Argument
Top level: Safety Goal is achieved
Second level: Safety Measures that contribute to goal
Third level: Evidence that measures are effective
For Each Safety Measure:
Describe the measure (what it does, how it's implemented)
Explain effectiveness (why it prevents/detects/mitigates the hazard)
Provide verification results (evidence from work products)
Reference ISO 26262 compliance (which clauses, tables, methods)
Use 3-Layer Defense Pattern
Layer 1 (Prevention): Robust design, derating, EMC
Layer 2 (Detection): Diagnostics, monitoring, plausibility checks
Layer 3 (Reaction): Safe state transition, degradation
Provide Evidence Trail
Requirements specification [Work Product ID]
Design specification [Work Product ID]
Implementation verification [Work Product ID]
Safety analysis (FMEA/FMEDA/DFA) [Work Product ID]
Testing results [Work Product ID]
Validation results [Work Product ID]
Address Gaps Proactively
If evidence is missing, acknowledge and plan to provide
If residual risks exist, explain mitigation or acceptance rationale
Output : Safety argument document with complete traceability
Reference : See resources/SAFETY_ARGUMENT_TEMPLATE.md for detailed template
Task 4: Calculating Safety Metrics SPFM Calculation Process:
Collect hardware FMEDA data (failure rates by component)
Classify each failure mode:
Safe faults (λS): Do not violate safety goal
Single-point faults (λSPF): Directly violate safety goal, no detection
Residual faults (λRF): Single-point faults not covered by safety mechanism
Detected single-point faults (λS,SPF): Detected by safety mechanism
Latent faults (λMPF,latent): Multi-point faults not detected in time
Apply SPFM formula
Verify against ASIL target
PMHF Calculation Process:
Identify fault combinations that lead to safety goal violation
Calculate failure rates for each path
Consider detection coverage and FTTI
Sum all contributions
Verify against ASIL target (10 or 100 FIT)
Reference : See resources/METRICS_CALCULATION_GUIDE.md for examples
Task 5: Preparing for Confirmation Review
Completeness Check
Requirements Check
Design Check
Analysis Check
Verification Check
Validation Check
Documentation Check
Reference : See resources/CONFIRMATION_REVIEW_CHECKLIST.md for detailed checklist
Best Practices
1. Start with Clear Item Definition
Define boundaries clearly
Document all interfaces and dependencies
Consider system-of-systems interactions
2. Be Systematic in HARA
Use structured hazard identification methods
Consider all operational scenarios
Document rationale for S, E, C ratings
3. Design for Safety from the Start
Don't add safety as an afterthought
Use proven design patterns (redundancy, diversity, monitoring)
Plan for safe states and degradation
4. Maintain Traceability
Use requirements management tools
Create traceability matrices
Keep documentation synchronized with design
5. Verify Early and Often
Review requirements before design
Analyze design before implementation
Test at every level (unit, integration, system, vehicle)
6. Document Rationale
Explain design decisions
Justify ASIL ratings
Document assumptions and constraints
7. Plan for Independence
Ensure verification is independent of development
Use independent safety assessors
Maintain objectivity in reviews
8. Manage Changes Rigorously
Impact analysis for all changes
Regression analysis
Update safety arguments and evidence
Example: EPS (Electric Power Steering) System This Skill can reference the existing EPS safety documents in your project:
Safety Concept : /Safety concept.md
Safety Arguments : /safety_goal_arguments.md
HARA Results : Safety Goals SG1-SG5 with ASIL B, D ratings
Degradation Modes : DM1-DM6 defined
Key Safety Goals for EPS:
SG1: Sudden loss of assist shall be prevented (ASIL B)
SG2: Unintended steering shall be prevented (ASIL D)
SG3: Unintended wheel motion shall be prevented (ASIL B)
SG4: Lock steering shall be prevented (ASIL D)
SG5: Loss of ADAS function shall be prevented (QM)
Reference the project files when working on EPS-specific tasks.
Additional Resources For more detailed guidance on specific topics, see:
resources/HARA_TEMPLATE.md - Step-by-step HARA template
resources/SAFETY_ARGUMENT_TEMPLATE.md - Safety argument structure and examples
resources/FSR_TEMPLATE.md - FSR specification template
resources/VERIFICATION_CHECKLIST.md - Comprehensive verification checklist
resources/ISO_26262_QUICK_REFERENCE.md - Quick reference for ISO 26262 clauses and tables
When NOT to Use This Skill
For non-automotive safety standards (use IEC 61508 or other relevant standards)
For cybersecurity (use ISO/SAE 21434 instead)
For SOTIF (Safety of the Intended Functionality) - use ISO/PAS 21448
For general quality management (use IATF 16949)
Summary This Skill provides expert-level guidance on ISO 26262 functional safety for automotive systems. Use it whenever you need to:
Navigate the safety lifecycle
Apply ISO 26262 methods and techniques
Create safety documentation
Build convincing safety arguments
Ensure compliance with the standard
Always maintain a systematic, traceable, and evidence-based approach to functional safety.
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